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ABSTRACT 
Research shows that humans are, on average, only slightly better-than-chance at 
deception detection. Meta-analysis conducted by Charles Bond and Bella DePaulo in 
their work “Accuracy of Deception Judgments” published by Personality and Social 
Psychology Review in 2006 yields an across-study average accuracy rate of 54%. 
Although prior research has failed to identify variables that have a large impact on 
accuracy, a recent set of studies focused on diagnostic utility (strategic questioning) leads 
us to expect substantial question effects producing levels of accuracy that differ 
substantially from chance. Recent research advocated for abandoning cue-based 
deception detection in favor of the idea of diagnostic utility. Specifically, this new line of 
research provides a basis for specifying the conditions under which questioning of honest 
and deceptive individuals yields levels of deception detection accuracy that depart 
substantially in both directions from the usual slightly-better-than-chance results that 
characterize past attempts.  This thesis is a replication of these most recent diagnostic 
utility studies to determine if the methods are (1) generalizable to a new population and 
(2) useful in identifying specific questioning strategies relevant to Department of Defense 
and fraud investigation activities. 
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The body of work concerning interpersonal deception detection has, for decades, 
focused on the verbal and nonverbal cues of those being questioned. Regardless of the 
setting or sample, the methods of questioning subjects have not ventured beyond what the 
subject emits as cues. Over the course of the last decade, however, a new school of 
thought has emerged. Although there is an abundance of collected works on deception 
detection, this is the first thesis of its kind at the Naval Postgraduate School to study in 
detail the use of content- and context-based questioning within a military population. The 
issues discussed in this thesis have wide-ranging applicability both in the military and 
accounting/acquisition fraud environments. In evaluating how accurately military officers 
detect deception and what information is relied upon to make veracity judgments, the 
authors’ overall research will be replicating previous studies conducted by Levine, Blair, 
and Clare (2014) and Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, and Ferrara (2002) on a 
previously unexamined population: domestic military officers. The successful completion 
of this thesis will not only add to the body of knowledge on the topic of deception 
detection but has the possibility for further replication in classified subsets such as 
defector interrogation and counterintelligence.  
A. BACKGROUND/PROBLEM 
The predominance of nonverbal cue-related research in the field of deception 
detection has led to stagnation in terms of accuracy improvement. Using the Levine et al. 
(2014) methodology of diagnostic utility, this thesis will show replicability and 
applicability within a military context. Furthermore, through applying the principles of 
Park et al.’s (2002) research, this thesis will examine how the population determines 
deception.  
1. Deception Detection Accuracy 
Until recently, research into deception detection has focused primarily upon 
interviewees’ non-verbal cues. Decades of research on these non-verbal cues shows 
human beings are barely better than chance, garnering nothing more than a meta-analysis 
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accuracy rate of 53.46% (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Most people believe in the fallibility 
of physical human nature, and that subtle nonverbal cues—the crossing of legs, the 
twitching of an eye, or the drumming of fingers—provide the critical clues to identifying 
when deception is occurring (Levine, Blair, & Clare, 2014). This can be seen on popular 
television programs, for example, when a player in a high-stakes poker match or an 
interrogated criminal suspect shows behavior that demonstrates leakage or a tell sign. 
Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) most recent meta-analysis, however, looking at 208 
deception detection accuracy studies, finds the opposite is true. When relying on 
nonverbal cues, people are not much better than chance (50%) in any given situation 
when attempting to determine if somebody is lying. In the literature, an accuracy ceiling 
of 65% exists (Levine et al. 2014).   
The focal point of Study 1 is replicating research conducted by Levine et al. 
(2014), which indicates that more useful strategies can lead to better deception detection 
accuracy. Specifically, Levine et al. argue that what has been lacking for decades is 
attention paid to the specific question strategies used in interview situations. One 
important concept related to question strategies is diagnostic utility. Diagnostic utility is a 
scalable level upon which an individual uses information to form a correct conclusion. 
This scale ranges both positive and negative in that negative information would be 
viewed as deceptive. As noted by Levine et al. (2014) in their sixth experiment, which is 
being replicated in this research study (and which involves diagnostic utility), Levine and 
his colleagues were able to raise accuracy levels in excess of 70%. 
2. How People Really Detect Lies 
The prevailing deception detection literature and experimentation have been 
based on the immediacy of non-verbal cues exhibited by an individual and interpreted by 
a recipient. Though this concept retains validity, it is inherently flawed as it fails to 
address the additional information a recipient possesses when he/she makes a 
determination of authenticity. As examined by Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, and 
Ferrara (2002), most individuals in lie determination settings rely upon information 
gathered prior to the detection of the lie. This elongated timeline includes “information 
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sources such as information from third parties, the consistency of statements with prior 
knowledge, the consistency of messages with physical evidence, and confessions,” which 
when taken into account with non-verbal cues build an individual’s truth/lie judgment 
(Park et al., 2002, p. 144). It is this combined effect of non-verbal and subjective 
historical evidence that forms the basis of Study 2. 
3. The Current Studies 
Study 1 replicates the sixth study in Levine et al.’s (2014) program of research 
using U.S. military officers to determine whether a replication with a different population 
would yield similar results and, thus, determine the generalizability of their findings. 
Study 2 replicates the Park et al. (2002) research, which that involved the applicability of 
historical subjective information in the detection of lies, to see if such information varies 
when applied to a different population. The results of both studies will help to better 
shape the field of interrogation, defector questioning, and fraud detection in U.S. military 
contexts.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to conduct the experimental replication and 
documentation of further improvement in deception detection accuracy over that of 
previous findings. The nature of this topic dictates the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative opportunities to further expand known knowledge of deception detection. 
Quantitatively, the focus will be on strategic questioning methods and resulting deception 
detection accuracy. Qualitatively, this research looks at when, how, and with what 
information deception is actually detected in the workplace. 
1. Study 1: Content and Context Questioning Effects on Accuracy 
Unlike the bulk of the previously conducted research, Study 1 aims to remove the 
focus on non-verbal cues. Question effects detail how the questioning of an individual 
may potentially impact the outcome of deception detection. It is specifically the 
manipulation of such question effects through the use of applied content and contextual 
questioning that the authors believe can and will lead to an increase in diagnostic utility. 
3 
Diagnostic utility is the overarching conceptual idea that information has varying 
amounts of utility, both positive and negative. It is the application of diagnostically useful 
statements that the authors measure as a means of deception detection.   
2. Study 2: How People Really Detect Lies 
The purpose of Study 2 is to examine what additional information the selected 
population rely upon in their truth/lie determinations and the associated time horizon with 
regards to deception realization. This study differs from traditional works in that, rather 
than focus on the questions or questioning method, it instead places emphasis on the 
individual detectors’ individual backgrounds and historical subjectivity. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
As our primary objective, this research study will provide a thorough and current 
review of the issues regarding deception detection and its applicable utility within the 
Department of Defense and other governmental agencies. Study 1 will seek to determine 
the role of specific question strategies and expertise (previous interview or interrogation 
training/experience) on deception detection accuracy by replicating Levine et al.’s (2014) 
research on diagnostic utility. Study 2 will seek to determine what subjective historical 
methods individuals use in deception detection by replicating Park et al.’s (2002) work on 
what information people use other than the verbal and non-verbal behaviors of the liar 
when determining deception. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis and associated studies are, in essence and design, a replication of 
Levine et al.’s (2014) and Park et al.’s (2002) studies to determine if both researchers’ 
results are generalizable beyond college students and law enforcement and useful in 
identifying specific questioning strategies relevant to DOD activities to include defector 
questioning and fraud examination. Specifically, this thesis aims to answer the following 
two research questions: 
• Utilizing the diagnostic utility methods of content and contextual questioning 
presented in the Levine et al. (2014) study, are Department of Defense officers 
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able to distinguish deception with greater accuracy than the previous meta-
analysis mean of 54%, and if so to what degree? 
• Utilizing the subjective historical reliance method outlined in Park et al. 
(2002), what types of information do U.S. military officers report using when 
detecting lies in the workplace? 
E. SCOPE 
This research project examines the abilities of U.S. military officers (N = 84) to 
detect deception when presented with high-stakes interviews where some interviewees 
lied and others told the truth. Specifically, Study 1 examines the role of specific 
questioning strategies and the expertise of the participants (expert vs. inexpert) in 
accuracy levels. Study 2 examines what, if any, additional subjective information 
participants use in determining deception and over what associated timeline did veracity 
judgments occur. This thesis merely looks to replicate both the Levine et al. (2014) and 
Park et al. (2002) research and determine whether either study is generalizable to a 
different population, namely U.S. military officers. Also, the results of these studies 
might shed light on appropriate high-stakes deception settings such as defector 
questioning and detection of fraud in DOD procurement and acquisition settings.      
F. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
(1) Assumptions 
As explained in both the Levine (2014) and Bond and DePaulo (2006) works, the 
primary assumptions of this research include that recent findings are not flukes and are 
instead related to changes in the research and empirical findings of older limited works. 
Additionally, this research study assumes domestic military officers are a distinct and 
different population from what has previously been studied. This uniqueness is a result of 
training received by military personnel, the inherent cultural emphasis on truthfulness, 
and risks associated with high-stakes deception. Lastly, another assumption is that Study 
2 will replicate the work of Park et al. (2002), given that Lindsey et al. (2012) is the only 
other existing replication of such results using a workforce sample. 
(2) Limitations 
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Previous deception studies assume participants will display a truth bias, in that 
human beings have shown over time a belief in the innate honesty of others (Park et al. 
2002). This explains the feelings of betrayal often exhibited by those who have 
experienced lies. For the purpose of this research, the authors assume the participants will 
operate with a truth bias.  However, truth bias is not manipulated or measured to 
determine if that is a replicable finding in the specific population studied. This thesis will 
not address any psychological factors such as mood, temperament, or any other 
conditions that might affect respondents’ participation. No financial constraints limited 
the authors, as data collection included only volunteer participation.  
G. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into two separate, but mutually reinforcing, studies. 
Chapters II–V comprises Study 1. Study 1 is the replication of Levine et al.’s (2014) 
study of diagnostic utility—or questioning effects—on the role of expertise on detection 
deception accuracy. Specifically, Chapter II is the literature review that introduces the 
history of deception detection research and related literature. Chapter III provides the 
Study 1 methodology, including information on participants, materials, and the 
procedure. Chapter IV presents the statistical results of Study 1, and Chapter V expands 
on those results through detailed discussion of the findings and their limitations. 
Chapters VI–IX comprises Study 2. Study 2 is the replication of Park et al.’s 
(2002) study of how people really detect lies in their everyday lives. Chapter VI is the 
literature review that introduces the premise of Park et al.’s (2002) research on how 
people actually detect lies in their interactions. Chapter VII provides the Study 2 
methodology, including information on participants and the procedure. Chapter VIII 
presents the results of Study 2, and Chapter IX expands on those results through detailed 
discussion of the findings and their limitations. 
Lastly, in Chapter X, the overall summary, conclusions, and recommendations for 
further deception detection research will be presented. 
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II. STUDY 1: BACKGROUND HISTORY/LITERATURE REVIEW 
Few things are as fundamentally human as the quest to accurately ascertain the 
veracity of one’s intentions. The earliest codified documents are rife with tales of, and 
punishments for, lying; be it from Indian Sanskrit Vedas or the Greek physician 
Erasistratus, humanity’s ordeal with the nature of truth remains a constant (Trovillo, 
1939).      
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DECEPTION DETECTION 
The historical underpinnings of deception detection begin with the initial reliance 
on what Trovillo (1939) notes as superstition and the concept of the Ordeal.   
It is significant that, with few exceptions, the historical accounts of 
deception-detecting from the days of Christ, through the Middle Ages, are 
the history of the Ordeal. Superstition so swayed the minds of people that 
it was the rule for them to ask for the Ordeal to prove their innocence. The 
accuser was not looking, evidently, for suspicious clues in the face or 
actions of the individual, for apparently the psychology of deceit did not 
exist. Even the religions of Europe, as late as the 16th Century, taught that 
proof of innocence or guilt would be furnished from on High in a variety 
of mystical modes. People did not consider that proof lay within or on the 
surface of the suspect himself. (p. 850) 
The Ordeal method of deception detection is easily understood when examined in the 
context of the early witch trials and the Inquisition of the 14th and 15th centuries where 
individuals were forced to participate in torturous tests where the outcome of the event 
was the prime determinate of the presence of deception. 
As religious fervor subsided and use of the scientific method began to flourish, so 
too did the study of emotional states and their bearing on deception detection (Trovillo, 
1939). One of the earliest such works was conducted by Mosso, an Italian physiologist. 
Mosso’s work focused on the effect of fear with regard to deception, specifically the fear 
one experiences in being detected. Mosso’s measurement of blood flow as it circulates 
and pools in the body led to the first crude attempts to measure the physiological effects 
of deception (Trovillo, 1939).   
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What these two examples illustrate is the ever shifting framework through which 
deception detection has been viewed. Recent, cutting-edge research indicates that 
diagnostic utility—or the degree to which information is useful as prompted through 
strategic questioning—is key to understanding how humans detect deception. Prior 
theories, however, hinge upon the psychological and physiological states of the person 
lying, and the resulting nonverbal cues that could be “read” to detect deception. The 
recent work on diagnostic utility questions the usefulness of these nonverbal cues that 
might or might not yield diagnostically useful information about whether somebody is 
lying. Such reliance on nonverbal cues has yielded detection accuracy rates that are not 
much different than chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). As such, the concept of diagnostic 
utility presented in this thesis is based on Levine et al.’s (2014) work and differs from the 
classical interpretation of diagnostic utility in that it includes the use of Park et al.’s 
(2002) additional reliance on subjective historical information. Specifically, Levine et al. 
(2014) indicate that diagnostic utility, in relation to deception detection, is the 
consideration of contextual message content including plausibility, correspondence with 
known facts and the correlation of the two, and these are what influence one’s true ability 
to detect deception. 
B. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS DECEPTION DETECTION ACCURACY 
STUDIES 
Upon review of the last four decades of deception detection research, a common 
theme emerges across all studies: a set of individuals is recruited as message initiators 
(liars or truth tellers), a separate group acts as the sample and is tasked to determine the 
veracity of the initiator’s message with accuracy being calculated as the proportion of 
correct judgments made by the sample and based on non-verbal low-risk deception 
settings (Park et al. 2002). Furthermore, the meta-data accuracy rate presented by these 
studies consistently falls around 57% (Kraut, 1980) and always between 45% and 70% 
(e.g., Kalbfleish, 1994; Miller & Stiff, 1993; Vrij, 2000). Over the past 40 years, and 208 
studies as noted by Bond and DePaulo (2006), this belief has been near collectively held 
in the literature (e.g., Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell, 1994; DePaulo, Kirkendol, 
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Tang, & O’Brien, 1988; Feeley, deTurck, & Young, 1995; Kalbfleisch, 1994; Millar & 
Millar, 1995; Stiff & Miller, 1986; Vrij, 1994).    
What deviated from this trend was the work by Levine et al. (2014) that focused 
on the previously described intrinsic value of diagnostic utility. Two complementary 
approaches to deception detection involving diagnostically useful information comprise 
the current pertinent body of knowledge concerning the subject. The Strategic Use of 
Evidence (SUE) method hinges on an interviewer possessing a form of useful evidence 
pertinent to the line of questioning without the interviewee knowing, in hopes the subject 
will inadvertently make false statements as compared to the evidence (Clemens, Granhag, 
& Strömwall, 2013). Further analysis regarding the way in which the evidence is 
presented during the interview leads to what has been described earlier as the Content in 
Context (CiC) technique. Both methods set an arbitrary baseline with presumably useful 
obtained, or obtainable, knowledge that allows the interviewer to measure the variable 
feedback (Levine et al., 2014). Providing useful knowledge and background specifics are 
critical to both methods and at the heart of this current study. 
C. STUDY DESIGN 
This study was a 3x2 mixed design with the three sets of questions presented in 
Table 3 as a repeated factor, the two levels of expertise (expert versus inexpert) as an 
independent groups variable, and detection accuracy as the dependent variable. Expertise 
was operationally defined using participants’ answers to the following question: Have 
you ever conducted interviewing or interrogation as a regular part of your job? 
Participants who answered “No” were coded as inexpert; those who answered “Yes” 
were coded as experts.  An additional question asked was, “Have you ever received 
formal interviewing or interrogation training?” Only 20% of participants had received 
such training; therefore, the sample size was too small to make meaningful comparisons 
in the current study using this question as a proxy for expertise.  Participant answers 
(their truth/lie judgments) were scored for accuracy by adding the number of correct 
judgments and dividing by the total number of judgments. 
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Each participant watched and rated 12 videotaped interviews of different students 
denying cheating. The 12 interviews used in the current study were the same interviews 
that were used in Levine et al.’s sixth study. For each of the question sets, two lying 
cheaters’ interview segments were shown. For each deceptive interview, a corresponding 
honest interview was selected by matching on sex, race, and approximate physical 
appearance. Thus, there were two honest non-cheaters and two lying cheaters, all of 
whom denied cheating, interviewed with each of the three question sets.   
D. RATIONALE FOR STUDYING DECEPTION DETECTION ACCURACY 
IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
Initial thoughts on deception detection in the military predominately involve 
intelligence and counter-intelligence specialty fields. As previously noted, however, the 
humanistic quality of deception means detection practices are relevant in all settings of 
interpersonal interaction. As a government entity, the military must always maintain 
ethical practices and morally sound principles, which in turn facilitate a strong truth bias. 
It is very difficult for individuals interacting within the military system, where it is 
reasonably assumed that all participants are honest brokers, to then exit the system and 
work with individuals whose motivations are self-serving and not bound by the same 
politico-social contract. Thus, deception is easily found in various forms in different 
specialties. Not all specialties or circumstances require deception detection training on 
the level of enemy combatant interrogation. Deception detection, however, is a useful 
tool in areas such as contracting fraud, military law enforcement, and varying degrees of 
leadership where high stakes deception can occur and where a healthy skepticism and 
base of training may aide mission accomplishment.     
Buller’s (1996) research on Interpersonal Deception Theory for the U.S. Army 
Research Institute serves as the primary academic linkage between this work’s analysis of 
deception detection theory and the military, and his four-year examination inadvertently 
parallels the same issues as the research questions posited in this work. Buller’s (1996) 
focus on issues related specifically to intelligence gathering personnel will be addressed 
further in Chapter X, which explores defector deception detection and the application or 
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influence of psycho-cultural lenses on strategic posturing/positioning as a focus of further 
research.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Study 1 research is based upon the qualitative replication of the Levine et al. 
(2014) methodology.  Utilizing the diagnostic utility methods of content and contextual 
questioning presented in the Levine et al. (2014) study, are Department of Defense 
officers able to distinguish deception with greater accuracy than the previous meta-
analysis mean of 54% and if so to what degree?    If the study holds true to the findings of 
Levine et al. (2014), then the authors should find a mean accuracy in excess of 54% and 
improvement most likely greater than 70%, with a corresponding minimal effect for 
expert judgments. Should the replication prove false, further research will be required to 
examine which portion of the study does not hold true in the chosen sample and to what 
amount modification will need to occur.  The next chapter fully details the methodology 
used in Study 1. 
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III. STUDY 1: METHODOLOGY 
In order to replicate the Levine et al. (2014) experiment 6 in an appropriately 
clinical method, the authors first sought approval of the NPS Institutional Review Board 
for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB). The authors completed the mandated IRB 
ethically based training and all additional reviews, and subsequently received approval to 
initiate research. All research occurred on campus in specially designated rooms designed 
to best replicate the atmosphere of the initial study. Daily findings and survey materials 
were maintained under secure conditions, and no leakage of personally identifiable 
information (PII) or demographics occurred.        
A. PARTICIPANTS 
The participants in this study were 84 U.S. military officers studying in resident 
programs at the Naval Postgraduate School. Tables 1 and 2 summarize participants’ rank 
and branch of service, respectively. Participants’ ages ranged from 22–51 (M = 33.74, SD 
= 4.86) and years of military service ranged from 1–27 (M = 12.21, SD = 5.31). Also, 
76.2% were male, 77.4% identified themselves as Caucasian/White, 8.3% were African 
American/Black, 4.8% were Asian/Pacific Islander, 8.3% were Hispanic/Latino(a), and 
1.2% indicated they were multiple races/ethnicities. In terms of expertise, 22.6% 
indicated they had received formal interviewing or interrogation training, and 40.5% 
reported that they had conducted interviewing or interrogation as a regular part of their 
jobs. All participants volunteered their participation and none received any form of 
compensation for their involvement in this research. Participation was anonymous with 
the only demographic information being gender, age, race, rank, years of military service, 
military branch, and level/use of interrogation training. 
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Table 1.   Participant Military Rank  
RANKS FREQUENCY PERCENT 
CW04 (Chief Warrant Officer 4) 1 1.2% 
O1 (Second Lieutenant/Ensign) 5 6% 
O2 (First Lieutenant/Lieutenant Junior Grade) 3 3.6% 
O3 (Captain/Lieutenant) 55 65.5% 
O4 (Major/Lieutenant Commander) 18 21.4% 
O5 (Lieutenant Colonel/Commander) 2 2.4% 
Table 2.   Participant Branch of Service 
BRANCH OF SERVICE FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Army 11 13.1% 
Navy 41 48.8% 
Air Force 10 11.9% 
Marines 21 25% 
Coast Guard 1 1.2% 
 
B. MATERIALS 
Twelve videotaped interview segments, which were all used in the Levine et al. 
(2014) examination of diagnostic utility and expertise in their sixth study, were used as 
the experimental stimuli in this current study. Specifically, each segment showed a 
university student being interviewed about cheating in a research-related trivia game. All 
students in the 12 segments denied cheating, but half (6) actually cheated. Thus, the 12 
video segments resulted in six honest students telling the truth (they denied cheating and 
they, in fact, did not cheat) and six dishonest students lying (they cheated but denied it in 
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the interview). See Levine et al. (2014, especially pp. 270–272) for a detailed description 
of how the experimental videotapes were created. The 12 interview segments represented 
three different diagnostic utility questioning strategies (see Table 3). 
Table 3.   Questions Asked in the Three Sets of Cheating Tapes (from Levine 
et al., 2014, p. 268) 
First Question Set 
1. Did you find the trivia questions difficult? 
2. Was teamwork much of a factor? How so, please explain. 
3. In looking at your score, you did better than other groups. Does this surprise you? 
4. How would you explain your success? 
5. Did cheating occur when I left the room? 
6. Why should I believe you? 
Second Question Set 
1. How much experience have you had working in teams? 
2. Have you played trivial pursuit games before? 
3. How often do you play? [follow-up] Why do you/don’t you play them much? 
4. In the current game, did you find the questions difficult? [follow-up] If you were 
    going to scale it on a scale of 1 to 10, what would you say they were in terms of 
    difficulty? (1 being easy and 10 being difficult) 
5. Was teamwork much of a factor in your performance? 
6. What would you say if I told you that you did better than other groups? 
7. How would you explain your performance? 
8. Did you cheat when the experimenter left the room? 
9. Are you telling me the truth? 
10. What would your partner say if I asked them the same question (question 9)? 
Third Question Set 
1. Tell me, in as much detail as you can, what happened during the trivia game? 
2. How well did you do on the trivia game? 
3. Which questions did you and your partner get right? 
4. For the answers you got right, explain how you knew the right answer? 
5. In detail, what happened when the experimenter left the room? 
6. Did any cheating occur? 
7. When I interview your partner, what will he/she say about cheating? 
8. Did you and your partner discuss cheating? 




Participants entered a lab setting, at which point they read and completed a 
consent document. After consenting to participate, each respondent watched a series of 
12 videotaped interview segments lasting approximately two minutes apiece. After each 
segment, the participant paused the video for as long as necessary to answer survey 
questions to make a truth-lie judgment regarding the individual in the video (see 
Appendix A for full questionnaire for Studies 1 and 2). Participants also answered a 
series of demographic questions. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Data were analyzed using mixed-model Multivariate Analysis of Variance, where 
question strategy was the repeated factor and expertise was the between factor, both 
comprising the independent variable and with accuracy as the dependent variable. Effect 
sizes are also reported. 
While the majority of the sample identified as Caucasian/White as shown in 
Figure 1, this is in keeping with the appropriate population percentages as published by 
The Department of Defense and based on 2010 Active Duty United States Military 
member personnel records (CNA Corporation, 2012). Additionally, the sample is in 
congruence with Naval Postgraduate School ethnicity demographics as published in the 
2013 NPS Factbook (Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). The small sample size for races 




Figure 1.  Race/Ethnicity 
As with race/ethnicity, the gender disposition as shown in Figure 2 is in keeping 
with the aforementioned 2010 Department of Defense Demographics Report. The sample 
size for this study, however, included a slight increase in female participation, percentile 
specific (CNA Corporation, 2012). This increase also holds true when examining the 
NPS population (Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). 
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Figure 2.  Gender 
As shown in Figure 3, the sample was composed of a diverse range of military 
ranks centered predominately on mid-career officers, O-3 and O-4, which is in keeping 
with the overall demographics of the school (Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). A mean 
time in service of 12.21 years and a standard deviation of 5.3 years coupled with the 
mean age of 33.74 years and a standard deviation of 4.8 years lend credibility to the 
belief that the sample is sufficiently experienced but may have an impact regarding the 
biases of the individuals. 
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Figure 3.  Rank 
As shown in Figure 4, the sample contained a diverse mixture of military 
branches loosely following the represented population. There was a slightly larger 
sampling of Marine Corps officers as compared to Army. The population typically holds 
the Army officer contingent slightly larger than that of the Marine Corps (Naval 




Figure 4.  Branch 
Using the mixed-model Multivariate Analysis of Variance with question strategy 
and expertise as the independent variables and accuracy as the dependent variable proved 
to be a logical method for data analysis, which lends itself to robust replication and 
expansion in further research.   The next chapter discusses the results of Study 1. 
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IV. STUDY 1: RESULTS 
The data were analyzed with a 3x2 mixed Analysis of Variance with the three 
question sets as a repeated factor, the two levels of expertise (expert vs. inexpert) as an 
independent groups variable, and detection accuracy (percent correct) as the dependent 
variable.  
Consistent with Levine et al. (2014), this study replicated the strong main effect 
for questioning strategy, F(2, 164) = 61.56, p < .001, η2 = .43. Although Levine et al. 
found a statistically significant main effect for expertise and a statistically significant 
question type x expertise interaction, this research study did not (one should note that the 
effect sizes for both of Levine et al.’s findings were trivial with both η2 = .01). 
Specifically, neither the main effect for expertise in this research study, F(1, 82) = 1.79, p 
= 0.18, nor the question by expertise interaction were statistically significant, F(2, 164) = 
0.05, p = 0.95. 
The cell means are presented in Table 4. Across experts and inexperts, accuracy 
was 37.5% (95% CI = ± 2.8%), 67.8% (95% CI = ± 2.6%), and 78.4% (95% CI = ± 
2.5%) for question sets 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Furthermore, accuracy means in all six 
cells were significantly different from both 50–50 chance and the 54% meta-analysis 
mean at p < .01. 
Table 4.   Mean Accuracy (and Standard Deviations) by Condition, Study 1 
Question Set Set One Set Two Set Three 
Expert 36.0% (23.2%) 66.2% (22.9%) 75.7% (22.6%) 
Inexpert 39.0% (26.8%) 69.5% (23.3%) 81.0% (22.3%) 
 
Participant veracity precision is not dependent upon expertise and increases both 
with the addition of diagnostically useful information and at a similar rate to that 
expressed in Levine et al. (2014).  The following chapter provides discussion, findings, 
limitations, and recommendations based on analysis. 
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V. STUDY 1: DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS  
The results, as hypothesized, replicated the previous findings illustrated in Levine 
et al.’s (2014) research. The importance of this is that the findings exhibited an increase 
in deception detection irrespective of expertise; both expert and inexpert categories saw a 
marked increase in accuracy as previously shown in Table 4.  
A. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
In light of the literature review, typical physical and nonverbal variables saw a 
replicable meta-data analysis mean of 54% (Bond & Depaulo, 2006), while the authors’ 
replicable method of manipulating question effects through the use of applied content and 
contextual questioning raised expert participant accuracy to 75.7% and inexpert 
participant accuracy to 81.0%. The accuracy increase of this replication using the 
previously defined sample of domestic military officers actually saw a notable increase in 
accuracy over the Levine et al. (2014) results, especially with regards to the inexpert 
category. The Levine et al. (2014) mean accuracy results are provided in Table 5 for 
comparison. 
Table 5.   Mean Accuracy (and Standard Deviation) by Condition (from 
Levine et al., 2014)  
Question Set Set One Set Two Set Three 
Experts 29.2% (22.9%) 64.3% (24.1%) 72.4% (22.2%) 
Student (Inexpert) 39.2% (24.1%) 66.6% (24.9%) 72.9% (22.7%) 
 
Additionally, the Levine et al. (2014) finding of “negative utility answers seem to hinder 
experienced judges more than positive utility answers assist experienced judges” holds 




Though the sample size (N = 84) could be considered small, it was directly 
representative of both the Naval Postgraduate School domestic officer population (Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2013) and comparatively demographically as diverse as the 
Department of Defense (CNA Corporation, 2012) and yet, despite the sample size, 
elicited a very strong positive accuracy effect when incorporating the new variables. This 
proves the usefulness and robust nature of the strategic questioning method.     
Additional limitations include the restriction of the sample to that of domestic 
officers and the single contextual nature of the lies examined in the experiment. The 
nature of deception in the military and financial fraud environments are inherently more 
high stakes than that of academic cheating.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
The value of this research is in applying the methodology to future deception 
detection training for inexpert domestic military officers.  The use of contextual and 
content based questioning was most beneficial to the inexpert sample meaning initial 
training of deception detectors should be focused primarily on this style.  Follow-on or 
remedial training for expert detectors should incorporate elements of diagnostic utility. 
However, trainers should not expect the same return as when used with inexpert subjects.  





VI. STUDY 2: BACKGROUND HISTORY/LITERATURE REVIEW 
The focus of Study 2 is the qualitative factor of deception detection vice the 
quantitative issue of accuracy as in Study 1. Study 2 seeks to determine what factors, in 
addition to non-verbal cues and leakage, individuals use when making a truth/lie 
judgment. As Park et al. (2002) argue that there are four false assumptions that previous 
research has relied on in believing the primacy of verbal and non-verbal behaviors of the 
messenger—“questions researchers have asked, the research designs used to study 
deception detection, the directions the literature has taken, and the theories used to 
predict and explain the results” (p. 147)—Study 2 directly addresses the issues of the first 
and second assumptions by broadening the field of questions asked in relation to the 
underpinning reasons for the truth/lie judgment and by modifying the study to attempt 
replication of the Park et al. (2002) findings.     
The only other study of workplace deception detection, Lindsey, Dunbar, and 
Russell (2011), specifically examined the relational aspect of the power dynamic to that 
of deception detection. The study consisted of a sample of 214 employed individuals of 
which 55% were in a management/supervisor status, of which (N = 96) stated they had 
engaged in deception in the workplace (Lindsey et al., 2011). Remarkably, “no lies were 
uncovered through the interpretation of nonverbal cues, rather they were discovered after 
the fact through evidence or confessions” (Lindsey et al., 2011, p. 74). This effect of 
after-the-fact evidence and complete disregard for nonverbal variables coupled with the 
workplace power dynamic lends great weight to attempting a replication of the study 
within the highly charged culture of the military, where both power and stakes are greatly 
increased.        
Further support of investigating the qualitative rationale for veracity judgment is 
provided by Park et al., who argue in How People Really Detect Lies (2002) that the 
majority of previous studies relied too heavily on the nonverbal cues of interviewees in 
addition to factors such as: 
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(1) Sources and judges in deception detection experiments were most often 
 unacquainted and that detection accuracy might be higher if judges had 
 relational or idiosyncratic knowledge of the message source. 
(2) Participants had only rarely been allowed to interact face-to-face. 
(3) Lies are often sanctioned (encouraged to a degree) by the researcher. This 
 argument holds that liars telling sanctioned lies should be less aroused 
 than those telling unsanctioned ones. Consequently, unsanctioned lies 
 should be more easily detected than sanctioned lies, and detection 
 accuracy might be better if more researchers studied unsanctioned lies. 
(4) Predominance of testing under conditions of everyday vice high-stakes 
 lies. 
Awareness of these limiting assumptions must be noted when conducting 
deception research. The risk associated with the factors listed above can be mitigated 
through the use of content- and context-based questioning regimens.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Utilizing the Park et al. (2002) method, what types of information do U.S. 
military officers report using when detecting lies in in the workplace? If the study holds 
true to the original as set forth by Park et al. (2002), the authors expect to find that the 
vast majority of individuals report using subjective historical information or after-the-fact 
data rather than non-verbal cues to detect deception.  The following chapter discusses the 
methodology used for Study 2.   
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VII. STUDY 2: METHODOLOGY 
Replication of Park et al.’s (2002) study occurred in an appropriately clinical 
manner, beginning with the authors’ approval of the NPS Institutional Review Board for 
the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB). The authors completed the mandated IRB 
ethically based training and all additional reviews, and subsequently received approval to 
initiate research. All research occurred on campus in specially designated rooms designed 
to best replicate the atmosphere of the initial study. Daily findings and survey materials 
were maintained under secure conditions, and no leakage of personally identifiable 
information (PII) or demographics occurred. Upon completion of the study, the 
questionnaires were divided, and all qualitative information was independently coded by 
two coders.    
A. PARTICIPANTS 
Participation in Study 2 was fully voluntary and anonymous, and comprised the 
identical sample used in Study 1: U.S. military officers (N = 84) serving as students at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 discussed in 
Chapter III for Study 1 provide the full details and breakdown of the participant 
demographics.   
B. PROCEDURE 
After completing the truth-lie judgments in Study 1, respondents were asked a 
series of open-ended questions following Park et al.’s (2002) protocol (see Appendix: 
Consent Form and Questionnaire). Specifically, participants were told to recall a recent 
work-related situation in which they discovered that someone lied to them, and they were 
asked to remember as much as they could about what happened.  
Participants were asked to write a detailed description of the event: 
(1) Recall as much as you can about the situation in which the person  
 originally lied to you. In as much detail as possible, describe the event 
27 
 where you were lied to: Where did it happen? What was the lie about? If 
 you can, be sure to write down the exact thing that the person said to you. 
Next, respondents were asked a series of questions related to some of the details 
surrounding the situation: 
(2) How long ago did this event (the lie) originally take place? 
(3) What was/is the relationship between you and the person who lied to you? 
(4) Now, think about how you found out that the person lied to you. Describe 
 in as much detail as you can the events surrounding your discovery of the 
 lie: how exactly did you find out that the person lied to you?  
2. Coding of Qualitative Data 
All questionnaires were collected from participants upon conclusion of their 
session and independently coded by two coders. The coding scheme was created by the 
authors based on N = 84 data collected from willing United States military officers 
serving in resident student capacity at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Participation was 
fully voluntary and anonymous and comprised the identical sample used in Study 1.  
Upon coding completion, the inter-coder reliability (Kappa) was calculated and any 
discrepancies were resolved via discussion between coders and the primary thesis 
advisor. This data is further reported in the results section. The qualitative codebook 
comprises the following questions and their associated Kappa. The question addressing 
“how long ago the lie was originally told” was coded using months as the unit of measure 
with a resulting Kappa of .99. The question of linking “relationship” included none 
specified, superior/immediate boss, superior/above immediate boss, subordinate, child, 
spouse, immediate family member (brother, sister, mom, dad), peer/friend, 
teacher/caregiver, senior in rank (but no command relationship), and other. Relationship 
coding resulted in a Kappa of .91. The “discover method” coding options included none 
listed, 3rd party information, physical information, solicited direct confession, unsolicited 
direct confession, at-the-time verbal and/or nonverbal behavior, inconsistencies with 
prior knowledge, combination of two or more, and other. The “discovery method” Kappa 
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was .84. The question addressing the lapse of time between when the lie was told and 
when the subject discovered the lie was coded as no answer provided, immediate 
detection, less than one hour, less than one day, less than one week, less than one month, 
less than one year, and more than one year. The Kappa for time lapse was .72.  The 
second coder transcribed the listing of discovery method examples as presented in 
Chapter IX.  The following chapter will discuss the results of Study 2.    
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VIII. STUDY 2: RESULTS 
Study 2 respondents were asked to recall a work-related situation in which an 
individual lied to the participant; data was not collected or analyzed for 36 (43.4%) 
respondents who choose to recuse themselves of the question.  Additionally, one 
respondent noted deception by their child, as the current study is interested in workplace 
related deception this interfamilial deception was eliminated from further analysis.  
Therefore, the sample for the relational research question is N=84 while the rest are N=83 
to compensate for the removal of the non-workplace deception respondent.   
For those who chose to answer, 48 (57%) of the initial sample, the most common 
discovery methods were 3rd Party Information (16.9%) and Physical Information 
(14.5%).  The least common valid discovery method, excluding one answer (1.2%) that 
was not categorized, was At-The-Time Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior (0.0%).  Table 6 
delineates these findings while Table 7 presents examples of the discovery methods.  




Discovery Method ƒ %
None Listed 36 43.4%
Third Party Information 14 16.9%
Physical Information 12 14.5%
Solicited Direct Confession 2 2.4%
Unsolicited Direct Confession 4 4.8%
Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior 0 0.0%





Table 7.   Examples of Discovery Method Categories 
 
The second portion of the questionnaire regarded the amount of time, in months, 
that had passed since the respondent had been told the lie.  The range provided was 0-96 
months with the mean being 14.7228 and a standard deviation of 22.19018 as shown in 
Table 8. 
Table 8.    “How Long Ago” Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Analysis was then conducted on the relationship of the participant and the liar as 
displayed in Table 9.  Respondent disclosure analysis shows the primary relationship 
occurred between participants and subordinates (38.1%) with the least reported 
relationship between participants and superiors/immediate bosses (8.3%). 
DISCOVERY METHOD
A subordinate was supposed to complete a task and stated they had however, the 









A subordinate lied about drug use which was proven true by a positve urinalysis, 
subsequent eye-witness statements, and a drop in the individual's performance. 
An enlisted soldier was caught with drugs at the airport, the resulting court 
martial sentence was basis for discovery of the lie after the fact.
Third Party Information
Physical Information
A subordinate naval officer lied about adhering to the stipulations of temporary 
assigned duty orders, a peer of the deceiver informed the respondent of the lie.
An individual stated they had moved a class however, a computer system query 
by the respondent proved this to be false.
In response to an inquiry as to why an enlisted sailor could not work a New Year's 
Day shift the sailor confessed during non-judicial punishment that he had lied 
about being sick during the shift and instead was too hung-over to work.
A subordinate naval officer had missed a training session, when asked the reason 
he lied.  Several hours later the subordinate located the respondent, confessed, 
and appologized for the deception.
NO RESPONSES
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
How Long Ago 83 0 96 14.7228 22.19018
Valid N 83
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Table 9.   Frequencies of Participant and Liar Relationship 
 
The final question related to the relationship between the respondent being told 
the lie and the subsequent realization and discovery the lie had been told.  In 69 (83.1%) 
of the cases, participants either did not answer the question or the answer provided was 
too vague for objective discernment.  Of the lies told, 8 (9.6%) were the product of 
immediate veracity judgments.  Of note, the possibility of bias arises in the qualitative 
results as the participants were cued toward applicable near-term, work-related lies.  The 
remainder of the timing data can be found in Table 10. 
Table 10.   Frequencies of Lie Time Lapse 
 
In the highly charged culture of the military, where lies carry significant 
consequences, it is expected there will be a high participant and subordinate discovery 
method response.  Park et al. (2002) supports this with “…it can be argued that accuracy 
should be higher for high stakes lies because there should be more nonverbal leakage 
when the stakes are high” (p. 146).  This is increased if consequences are shared by the 
respondent. Examinations of further distinguishing discovery methods are detailed in 
Chapter IX.   
   
  
ƒ %
None Specified 36 42.9






No Answer Provided 69 83.1
Immediate Detection 8 9.6%
< One Day 3 3.6%
< One Week 3 3.6%
Total 83 100.0%
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IX. STUDY 2: DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
What is notable about this study’s findings in addition to Park et al.’s (2002) is 
that within the domestic military officer population there were no reported instances of 
at-the-time verbal/nonverbal discovery methods used.  This is in direct contradiction of 
the prevailing historically held concept as outlined in the literature review, that deception 
detection primarily coincides with the lie being told and is based on the verbal and 
nonverbal cues elicited by the liar.  
A. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS  
As hypothesized, this discovery method results closely resembled those of Park et 
al. (2002), 3rd party and physical information were the most prevalent discovery methods 
in both our works.  Table 11 is provided for comparison.   




As this study was directed at occupational deception, the frequency of 
subordinates as a participant in deception was a significant and expected departure from 
Park et al’s primacy of social deception.  This is also a possible limitation as other, more 
Discovery Method ƒ %
None Listed - -
Third Party Information 62 32.0%
Physical Information 35 18.0%
Solicited Direct Confession 7 3.6%
Unsolicited Direct Confession 16 8.2%
Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior 4 2.1%
Inconsistencies with Knowledge 4 2.1%





recent, higher stakes deception outside of the workplace may have occurred but was not 
reported and therefore not analyzed.     
Although Park et al.’s (2002) method was replicated, the resulting research 
indicates prevalence in the sample of immediate detection whereas Park et al.’s (2002) 
findings show “few recalled lies were detected on the basis of at-the-time source 
behaviors and that the deception detection time line is often much longer than is assumed 
commonly” (p. 156).  The resulting disparity may be due to the current study’s focus on 
workplace deception where the stakes are nominally greater and deception more costly. 
The reader is cautioned regarding these findings as in each of the research 
question results a large percentage of the population did not provide responses.  This 
could be a factor of participant fatigue as the experiment combined quantitative (Study 1) 
and qualitative (Study 2) aspects in one sitting.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
The use of third party, physical, and combinatorial detection methods illustrates 
the applicability of the approach when the detector is privy to significant amounts of 
pertinent information.  Access to such information provided for timely realization of 
deception, as noted previously in Table 10.  The greater the amount of diagnostically 
useful information, the more rapidly the sample was able to gauge veracity.  This 
illustrates the fallacy of verbal and nonverbal cues while reinforcing the importance of 
historical source material in truth-lie determination. Therefore, follow-on and remedial 
training for both expert and inexpert detectors should include a focus on pertinent 
information collection methods and associated use in the making of veracity judgments. 
The next chapter discusses the summary, conclusions and areas for further research.   
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X. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
The successful replication of previous studies using the unique sample of 
domestic military officers supports the argument of diagnostic utility usage over cue-
based deception detection.  With respect to Park et al’s (2002) findings “Despite both the 
sheer quantity of research and the consistency of findings there is a history of researchers 
voicing dissatisfaction with various features of earlier studies,” the authors’ goal to 
improve this consistency through both quantitative and qualitative reasoning has been 
satisfactorily accomplished (p. 144).  
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research was to conduct the experimental replication and 
documentation of further improvement in deception detection accuracy over that of 
previous findings.  Examining the applicability of the Levine et al. (2014) methodology 
of content and contextual based questioning strategies in deception detection coupled 
with Park et al.’s (2002) approach of defining what information military officers utilized 
when judging veracity can effectively support this experimental replication.  The nature 
of this topic dictates the use of both qualitative and quantitative opportunities to further 
expand known knowledge of deception detection. Quantitatively, the focus was on 
strategic questioning methods and resulting deception detection accuracy. Qualitatively, 
this research looked at when, how, and with what information deception is actually 
detected in the workplace.  The following sections provide answers to the research 
questions in this study based on the analysis in chapter V for Study 1 and in chapter IX 
for Study 2.   
Utilizing the diagnostic utility methods of content and contextual questioning 
presented in the Levine et al. (2014) study, are Department of Defense officers able 
to distinguish deception with greater accuracy than the previous meta-analysis 
mean of 54% and if so to what degree?  
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According to the analysis of the data culled from Study 1, the results of Levine et 
al.’s (2014) study of diagnostic utility and judge expertise are highly replicable with U.S. 
military officers.  The importance of this is that the findings exhibited an increase in 
deception detection irrespective of expertise.  Both expert and inexpert categories saw a 
marked increase in accuracy. In light of the literature review, typical physical and 
nonverbal variables saw a replicable meta-data analysis mean of 54% (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006), while the authors’ replicable method of manipulating question effects through the 
use of applied content and contextual questioning raised expert participant accuracy to 
75.7% and inexpert participant accuracy to 81.0%. The accuracy increase of this 
replication using the previously defined sample of domestic military officers actually saw 
a notable increase of almost 10% in accuracy for inexpert participants over the Levine et 
al. (2014) results. 
Utilizing the Park et al. (2002) method, what types of information do U.S. 
military officers report using when detecting lies in in the workplace? 
Analyzing the data from Study 2, it was apparent the sample of domestic military 
officers used 3rd party and physical information as the primary independent methods for 
detecting lies in the workplace.  The predominance of lie recognition occurred within 
immediately and involved relationships between participants and workplace subordinates.  
These findings help ascertain the nature of honesty in the workplace and reinforce the 
need for domestic service members to be properly trained in proper deception and fraud 
detection techniques regardless of their primary duties.      
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The quantitative and qualitative studies conducted during the course of this thesis 
have broadened the scope of deception detection with regards to domestic military 
officers and their determination of veracity judgments made in the workplace.   
Quantitatively, in the ability to replicate the Levine et al. (2014) findings in study 1, the 
results exhibit a positive applicability of questioning effects, namely diagnostic utility, 
when crafting deception detection activities.  The significance of the findings combined 
with a lack of a main effect, that expertise is not a factor, proves the applicability of 
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Study 1 to a wide range of customers.  Knowing that sophisticated training does not lead 
to a deception detection advantage is a sound financially feasible benefit for future use of 
this research.  On a qualitative level, Study 2 results suggest and reinforce the use of 
specific types of information that is required to actually detect deception in the workplace 
with the emphasis placed on individual detectors’ specific backgrounds and historical 
subjectivity.  Thus, in order to achieve the desired accuracy, additional information is 
needed for the majority of the selected population to correctly deduce deception 
realization.  Levine et al.’s (2014) comments support the value of research replication 
fundamentally with: “Thus, we see no reason to believe that our concept is limited to the 
cheating experiment context” (p. 286).  The culmination of this thesis is the agreement of 
the authors’ with that of Levine and the subsequent expansion of the research to that of 
DOD applicability.   
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The single context and limited population of the two conducted studies presents 
inherent limitations but in doing so provides opportunity for further research. The next 
step is to refine the questioning for specific customers. Such entities’ duties should 
include some form of high-stakes interrogation such as the military intelligence 
community regarding defector/counterintelligence questioning and financial examiners 
investigating high-dollar fraud. Follow-on research should seek to examine if this same 
effect is replicable in the international officer population at NPS. In doing so, such factors 
as region, predominant language, and cultural norms should be observed and included as 
demographic variables of interest. An in-depth international sample would also lend itself 
to the tailoring of strategic questioning methods used to investigate defector veracity. 
Though the purpose of this study was to assess the replicability and applicability of the 
diagnostic utility method of questioning, further refinement of scenarios specifically 
tailored to military and fraud examination should be crafted. Though military 
counterintelligence techniques will not be discussed due to classification issues, the 
reliance of the Association of Fraud Examiners fraud examination curriculum 
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2014) on the outdated methods of nonverbal 
variables for deception detection could benefit greatly from the inclusion of the 
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diagnostic utility method. Further research should examine the possibility of improving 
Study 2 participation by conducting the survey separately. 
Military intelligence, counterintelligence, and defector questioning 
A primary step in evaluating use in military intelligence and defector questioning 
is to examine wither the methods and results used in this research are applicable to 
international military officers and to what degree, positive or negative.  Further 
enhancement and subsequent analysis should be made in order to ascertain the effect of, 
and incorporate, improved psych-cultural factors which account for differences in 
language proficiency, education, and biases towards deception as societally defined.  This 
analysis should be conducted on a regionally aligned level and then further refined for 
individual countries on the basis of statistical significance.  Additionally, the Levine et al. 
(2014) finding of “negative utility answers hindering experienced judges more than 
positive utility answers assisting experience judges” which holds true in this experiment, 
should be further analyzed using a robust sample of deception detection experts.   While 
this research will be relatively straight forward, the real significance will be the 
evaluation of non-Western cultures and societies.  In furtherance of these studies and the 
broadening of the deception detection field, future researchers are guided to Alexander L. 
George’s (1967) work in analyzing Chinese Communist Army defectors during and after 
the Korean War;  Leon Goure’s (1968) RAND and Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) sponsored research into Viet Cong and North Vietnamese defector questioning; 
Granhag and Stromwall’s (2001) work on interpersonal deception as applied to 
interrogations; and lastly Levine et al.’s (n.d.) White Paper for the U.S. Army’s 
Intelligence Center and School on the military applicability of diagnostic utility for use in 
investigation and interrogation.  
Department of Defense and Civilian Fraud Investigation 
From 2001 through 2011, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, via the Department of Justice, identified 54 DOD contractor 
companies charged with criminal fraud and 300 DOD affiliated companies who had civil 
judgments for fraud rendered against them which in total defrauded the DOD of $1.1 
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trillion (Department of Defense, 2011).  Fraud on this scale is nothing short of shameful, 
what is most incriminatory, however, is the duration over which these acts took place.   
Without effective internal controls and appropriately trained government acquisition 
personnel in fraud deterrence and detection, the vulnerability for fraud will continue to 
exist (Rendon & Rendon, in press).   Correspondingly, the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners’ 2014 report to the nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse studied 1,483 
cases of civilian fraud resulting in “a potential projected global fraud loss of nearly $3.7 
trillion” (p. 4).  Regardless of the public or private arena, further research should be 
conducted using DOD acquisition professionals and certified fraud examiners in order to 
ascertain the abilities of the population and the applicability of diagnostic utility in their 
investigations to stem the tide of fraudulent deception.  An additional study, modeled on 









APPENDIX. CONSENT FORM AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
Consent Form 
You are invited to participate in a research study to measure your perceptions about 
others’ communication. The purpose of the research is to better understand how people’s 
perceptions of communication impact their judgments. Your participation should take 
about 30 minutes to complete.  
You will be asked to watch short video clips, make judgments about each clip, and 
complete a survey about past experiences you have had with similar communication 
situations. 
Your participation is voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip any questions or 
stop participating at any time without penalty. The alternative to participating in the 
research is to not participate.  
Your responses are anonymous and will not be linked to your identity in any way. No 
personally-identifying information will be collected – the survey only asks for broad 
demographic information and no other identifiers from participants. 
The anticipated benefit from this study is that the findings will contribute to a larger body 
of knowledge, and will be used to inform coursework at NPS. You will not directly 
benefit from your participation in this research. 
There are no known or anticipated risks associated with participation. 
Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected against release to 
unauthorized persons; however, there is a minor risk that data collected could be 
mismanaged. Only the researchers will have access to the data which will be stored on a 
password-protected computer.  
If you have questions regarding the research, or if you experience any injury or 
discomfort, contact Dr. Lisa Lindsey, LLindsey@nps.edu, Principal-Investigator. If you 
have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Naval 
Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831.656.2473, lgshattu@nps.edu. 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given 
the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to 
participate in this research and checking the box below, I do not waive any of my legal 
rights. 
☐ I consent to participate in the research study. 
☐ I do not consent to participate in the research study. 
You will see three sets of videotaped interviews. The basic situation is always the same, 
but the interviewer, the person interviewed, and the questions are different.  
Background: These clips are of interviews with college students who participated in a 
study about teamwork. Each subject had just played a trivia game with a partner for a 
cash prize. All participants were given an opportunity to cheat when the experimenter 
was called out of the room, and the answers were left in a folder within easy reach of the 
participants. Some participants cheated and others did not. All the people being 
interviewed on these tapes denied cheating. 
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Instructions: Watch each interview and decided if you think they cheated or not. For 
each interview, circle an answer indicating your opinion about whether you think that 
they were honest and didn’t cheat or that they really did cheat and are lying about not 
cheating.  
Set 1  Video: Exline1_4clips  (6 min.)    
Number  Interview Judgment (circle one) 
1  39  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
2  45  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
3  44  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
4  54  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
Set 2  Video: Exline2_4clips (11 min) 
Number  Interview Judgment (circle one) 
5  54  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
6  57  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
7  71  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
8  72  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
Set 3  Video: Exline4_4clips (12 min) 
Number  Interview Judgment (circle one) 
9  25  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
10  18  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
11  10  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
12  12  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
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Finally, we’d like for you to recall a recent work-related situation in which you 
discovered that someone lied to you. Please take a moment to think of an example and 
remember as much as you can about what happened. Keeping this situation in mind, 
please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Recall as much as you can about the situation in which the person originally lied 
to you. In as much detail as possible, describe the event where you were lied to: 
where did it happen? What was the lie about? If you can, be sure to write down 




















4. Now, think about how you found out that the person lied to you. Describe in as 
much detail as you can the events surrounding your discovery of the lie: how 









Please tell us about yourself (circle the correct answer or fill in the blank):    
Sex:  Male    Female      Age: ________  Years of Military Service: 
_______   
Rank:____________  Branch (circle one):  Army Navy   Air Force
 Marines 
Have you ever received formal interviewing or interrogation training?  No    Yes 
Have you ever conducted interviewing or interrogation as a regular part of your job?  No    
Yes 
Are you:    U.S. Military International Military (please specify country) 
________________ 
Race/Ethnicity: Caucasian/White      
African American/Black      
Asian/Pacific Islander      
Hispanic/Latino(a)    
American Indian 
Alaskan or Hawaiian Native  
Other (please specify) ______________________________ 
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